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An increasing number of companies voluntary disclose information about their social 
and environment performance in sustainability reports. This study investigates the causes 
and consequences of choosing different assurance providers for companies seeking 
independent verification of their sustainability reports. We employ a logistical regression 
analysis from an international sample of 136 companies to document that companies 
domiciled in countries with a weaker governance system are more likely to choose a 
big-4 accounting firm as assurance provider. We additionally examine the association 
between the type of assurance provider and the quality of a sustainability assurance 
statement. Using a content analysis based on an existing framework (O’Dwyer and 
Owen, 2005), we provide evidence that big-4 accounting firms positively affect assurance 
quality in terms of reporting format and assurance procedures. In contrast, the quality of 
the recommendations and opinions in a sustainability assurance statement is positively 
associated with non-accounting assurance providers. 
1. Introduction
An increasing number of companies disclose information about their social and 
environmental performance in, so-called, sustainability reports to demonstrate a 
commitment to corporate responsibility. Recent evidence documents the rise of external 
assurance services that independently verify this type of non-financial reports (Beets 
and Souther, 1999; FEE, 2004; Ifac, 2006). According to a recent worldwide survey, 
between 1997 and 2007 the average annual growth rate in assurance statements has been 
20%, with a current proportion of assured reports settled at 25% (Corporateregister, 
2008). From the 2005 KPMG survey of corporate responsibility reporting, it appears 
that one-third of the fortune global 250 companies adopt an assurance statement of 
their sustainability report (KPMG/UVA, 2005). The voluntary demand of independent 
verification by reporting companies can be explained by their willingness to enhance a 
report’s credibility. These claims are consistent with prior research in auditing indicating 
that third-party assurance provides greater user confidence in the reliability of the 
information disclosed (see Carey et al., 2000).
Since the market for sustainability assurance services is in its formative stages and is 
evolving rapidly, there is limited understanding of the nature and extent of the demand 
and supply of this novel auditing practice (Hasan et al., 2005). O’Dwyer and Owen 
(2005), drawing on a sample of assurance statements of firms short-listed for the 2002 
ACCA sustainability reporting award, identify major differences among assurance 
levels since there is no generally accepted standard in this area. Three approaches have 
taken a dominant role, namely the global reporting initiative guidelines (GRI, 2002), the 
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AA1000 assurance standard (AA1000AS) of accountability (2003), and the IAASB’s 
international standard on assurance engagements (ISAE3000) (IAASB, 2003). As a 
consequence, sustainability assurance statements reveal great variability across countries 
with regard to definitions, methodology and content of assurance engagements (cf. 
Deegan et al., 2006). 
Similarly, cross-country variation of type of assurance provider is apparent from a survey 
sponsored by CPA Australia (2004). In the four major geographic regions classified from 
a sample of 161 assurance statements, large audit firms provided assurance on 87% of 
reports in Japan, 60% in continental Europe, 23% in the UK, and 15% in Australia. A 
recent paper by Mock et al. (2007) examined a sample of 130 firms worldwide that issued 
a sustainability report between 2002 and 2004. Their analysis suggested that different 
characteristics inherent to the level of assurance provided are significantly associated 
with the type of assurance provider, lending support to higher level of expertise in non-
financial assurance by auditing firms (big-4 accounting firms) in comparison with other 
types of assurance providers (e.g. Environmental consultants). 
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we extend the study by mock et al. (2007) 
by proposing a predicting model of the choice of an assurance provider for a worldwide 
sample of 136 companies that were short-listed for the 2005 ACCA Sustainability 
Reporting Award. We draw on current research in international accounting and finance 
to predict the likelihood of a firm’s voluntary choice of a big-4 accounting firm as 
sustainability assurance provider. Second, we provide exploratory evidence about the 
role of big-4 assuror firms in explaining varying levels of sustainability assurance by 
content analyzing 69 available statements from the selected sample. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop a 
set of testable predictions about choice of assuror and expected impact on the quality 
of assurance provided. Section 3 presents the sample data and the variables used to test 
our hypotheses. Section 4 reports the empirical results and section 5 concludes the paper 
with suggestions for further research.
2. Hypothesis development 
2.1.  Choice of assurance provider
The first research objective of this paper is to investigate the choice of a specific assurance 
provider to independently verify a sustainability report. Globally, over 350 different 
providers produced an assurance statement during 2007 (Corporateregister, 2008). Three 
major assuror types can be distinguished, namely accounting firms (big-4), certification 
bodies and specialist consultancies. In 2007, these assurance providers held respectively 
40%, 25% and 24% of the market for a total of 89% of the entire market of sustainability 
assurance services (Corporate Register, 2008). 
In line with most auditing research, we classify big-4 accounting firms as high quality 
assurance providers compared to other assurors types (see Francis, 2004). Accounting firm 
size is a proxy for quality (auditor independence) because no single client is important 
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to a large auditor and the auditor has a greater reputation to loose (their entire clientele) 
if they misreport. Due to their size, big-4 firms are also better able to enforce internal 
mechanisms of control to ensure consistent quality of the assurance reports issued by 
their members. 
We draw on recent international accounting and finance literature that examined the 
choice of auditing and assurance practices using various cross-country comparative 
studies. This line of enquiry notes that national legal environments are key determinants 
of auditing procedures around the world. While controlling for firm- and industry-level 
effects, our empirical prediction is that a country-level legal environment is a significant 
determinant of the choice of assurance provider. Findings by Durnev and Kim (2005) 
and Choi and Wong (2007) indicate that governance mechanisms, such as having an 
independent audit or assurance, can serve as a substitute for absent or weak country-level 
institutions that constrain the behavior of contracting parties. These papers argue that, 
in countries with stronger legal systems and other institutions, a firm has less to gain 
from independent audits because existing country-level institutions impose constraints 
on contracting parties and may therefore provide sufficient protection. 
The empirical prediction that emerges under this view is that the likelihood to choose a 
high quality assurance provider (big-4) is greater in countries with weaker legal regimes 
because auditing serves as a substitute for the absence of other institutions that facilitate 
private contracting. In addition, when litigation risks are sufficiently low in presence of 
weak enforcement mechanisms, auditing services from big-4 firms may become more 
affordable since the benefits of auditors of acquiescing to clients outweigh the potential 
penalties. Hence our first hypothesis:
H1:  the likelihood of choosing a big-4 firm as assurance provider for a sustainability 
report is higher for companies domiciled in countries with a weak legal 
environment.
2.2. Quality of assurance 
The second research objective of this study is to investigate whether the choice of 
an independent assuror has an effect on the quality of the assurance provided.  A 
substantive difference in the quality of assurance provided by assurors coming from 
different backgrounds, namely big-4 versus other type of verifiers, can be expected. 
On the one hand, it can be posited that accounting firms bring in their experience from 
providing financial assurance services and have a competitive advantage with respect 
to the provision of assurance services in general. On the other hand, it is possible that 
other assurance providers (e.g. Environmental consultant specialists) have a better 
expertise in this area, since sustainability assurance requires knowledge about complex 
environmental and social processes. 
We draw on a recent study by mock et al. (2007) that examined a sample of 130 firms 
worldwide issuing a sustainability report between 2002 and 2004. Mock et al. (2007) is the 
first study that applies multivariate statistics to identify relationships between assurance 
statement characteristics and big-4 assurance providers. Their findings reveals that the 
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type of assurance statement (positive or negative), the reporting categories assured, 
the restriction of the usage of assurance statements and the application of assurance 
frameworks are significant predictors of a big-4 assurance provider.
In our opinion, the model proposed by Mock et al. (2007), with the choice of assurance 
provider as dependent variable and selected criteria of assurance quality as predictors, 
is not appropriate. We argue instead that the analysis should reversely focus on the 
differential effects of assurance provider’s choice on varying level of assurance quality. 
Furthermore, we refine their model by classifying the quality of a sustainability assurance 
statement using the evaluative framework proposed by O’Dwyer and Owen (2005). Three 
categories of assurance quality are identified, namely “reporting format”, “assurance 
procedures” and “recommendations and opinion”. A description of the categories is 
provided in the variable measurement section.
Our empirical prediction is that big-4 firms put more emphasis on aspects related to 
“reporting format” (which includes formal aspects such as clear references and respective 
responsibilities of reporter and assuror) and “assurance procedures” (which refers to 
specific adherence to standardized approaches and recognized assurance standards) 
compared to other assurors. Accounting firms are expected to benefit from their long 
experience of financial audits and are likely to outperform other type of assurors in the 
formal application of non-financial assurance services. On the contrary, when quality 
of assurance refers to “recommendations and opinion” contained in a statement, it can 
be expected that non-big-4 firms are more elaborate and informative. This is consistent 
with Deegan et al. (2006) who provide evidence that accountants regularly apply a 
more conservative and cautious approach than, for instance, environmental consultants. 
Accountants are hesitant to draw clear and precise conclusions from the assurance 
engagement given the uncertainties surrounding the domain of sustainability assurance 
provision. Since no mandatory reporting guidelines exist and since many firms make use 
of a combination of different guidelines, it seems that accountants are cautious to report 
on compliance and provide high levels of assurance. Following this line of reasoning, 
we posit the following hypotheses:
H2a:  The quality of sustainability assurance is positively associated with a big-4 
assurance provider for the category “reporting format”.
H2b: The quality of sustainability assurance is positively associated with a big-4 
assurance provider for the category “assurance procedures”.
H2c: The quality of sustainability assurance is negatively associated with a big-4 
assurance provider for the category “recommendations and opinion”.
3. Research method 
3.1. Sample
The sample used to test the hypothesis comprises those firms that are short listed for the 
2005 ACCA Sustainability Reporting Award. One criterion in the evaluation scheme of 
the sustainability awards is third-party assurance. Thus, this sample selection increases 
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the probability to obtain a sample that provides sufficient assured sustainability reports 
to conduct a meaningful statistical analysis. In total, 200 companies are short-listed for 
the individual sustainability awards. The final sample is reduced due to the fact that, for 
a variety of firms, either the data for the independent variables cannot be collected, or 
no sustainability report can be obtained. Sustainability reports are obtained by scanning 
both the companies’ websites and the database by Corporateregister, which is the world’s 
largest database of non-financial reports (Mock et al., 2007), or by requesting the report 
directly to the firm. This leads to a final sample consisting of 136 firms. 
Table 1.  Country origin of sampled firms
Country No. of firms No. of Assurance statements
Australia/NZ 34 23
Hong Kong 8 4
Ireland 6 2
Malaysia 12 2
North America 15 4
Pakistan 4 2
Singapore 5 0
South Africa 19 9
Sri Lanka 7 2
UK 14 13
European countries (others) 12 8
Total 136 69
Table 2.  Summary statistics per industry
Sector No. of firms
Energy 9
Materials 17
Industrials 18
Consumer discretionary 11
Consumer staples 13
Health care 6
Financials 29
Information technology 4
Telecommunications services 7
Utilities 22
Total 136
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Table 1 displays the number of companies entering the sample from the respective regions. 
Table 2 presents the distribution of the companies in our sample per industry. The largest 
fraction comes from the financial sector, which represents roughly 21% of the sampled 
firms. The industry with the lowest fraction of firms in the sample is the information 
technology sector representing 3% of the total sample. The sampling procedure results 
in the identification of 69 assurance statements distributed across the sample countries 
as shown in table 1. Thus, a proportion of 51% published a sustainability report that was 
accompanied by independent assurance. The reports assured by a big-4 firm are 46%. 
3.2. Empirical models, variables and descriptive analysis     
For the model predicting the choice of assurance provider, we set up the following 
logistic regression model (1):
Audi = α + β1gotrj + β2enf j + β3lit j + β4ncri j + β5sizei + β6profi+ β7indi + e
Where, for every country j and firm i in our sample:
Aud = 1 if a firm’s sustainability report is assured by a big-4 firm and otherwise 0;
Gotr = corporate governance transparency at country level developed by bushman et 
al. (2004);
Enf = quality of national legal environment composed of a law enforcement index and 
an investor protection index provided by la porta et al. (1998);
Lit = liability standard index developed by la porta et al. (2006) incorporating the 
ease with which investors can sue auditors;
Ncri = national corporate responsibility index computed by accountability (2005);
Size = firm’s size measured by the natural log of a firm’s sales;
Prof = firm’s profitability measured by the natural log of a firm’s return on assets;
Ind = 1 if a firm is a member in environment sensitive industry and otherwise 0. Industry 
affiliation to a sensitive industry is determined using a slightly modified version 
of patten (1991). It included industries in the petroleum, chemical, forestry and 
paper products.
Model (1) predicts that the choice of a big-4 accounting firm as assurance provider is 
negatively associated with the quality of governance and legal country regime proxied by 
three indexes commonly used in most accounting and finance studies (gotr, enf, lit). We 
introduce four control variables in the model. Ncri ranks country regimes with respect 
to a broad range of social and environmental-related institutional factors. Further, three 
variables control for industry- (ind) and firm-related (size, prof) characteristics. Since our 
sample comprises 91% of firms domiciled in common law countries, the variable about 
legal tradition that is commonly used in cross-country studies was not included.
For robustness analysis, we also run an ordered probit regression (model 2) with the 
same predictors and a dependent variable having the value of 0 for firms not issuing a 
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sustainability assurance statement, a value of 1 for firms issuing a statement not verified 
by a big-4 firm, and a value of 2 for firms that accompany a report with an assurance 
statement issued by a big-4 firm. In fact, the decision of a firm to assure a sustainability 
report by an accounting assurance provider is conditional upon the decision of issuing a 
statement in first place. Model (2) allows testing these two decisions in combination. 
For the quality analysis, the following regression models are set up:
Repi = α + β1audi + β2gotrj + β3enf j + β4lit j + β5ncri j + β6sizei + β7profi + β8indi + e     (3);
Proci = α + β1audi + β2gotrj + β3enf j + β4lit j + β5ncri j + β6sizei + β7profi + β8 indi + e  (4);
Opii = α + β1audi + β2gotrj + β3enf j + β4lit j + β5ncri j + β6sizei + β7profi + β8indi + e     (5);
Where rep, proc and  opi capture respectively the quality of assurance statement for 
the categories “reporting format”, “assurance procedures” and “recommendations and 
opinion”. Models (3), (4) and (5) contain the same variables defined above, with aud 
now examined as independent variable and the country- and firm-level variables from 
model (1) inserted as control variables. 
The quality of assurance statements is determined by means of a content analysis based 
on the evaluative framework provided by O’Dwyer and Owen (2005), which introduces 
the minimum requirements of a high quality assurance statement as defined by the three 
most commonly used international guidelines accountability (2003),  FEE (2004) and 
Gri (2002). Overall, 19 aspects and the accompanying coding rules used for the content 
analysis are reported in appendix. A coding procedure that involved both authors was 
followed to ensure high levels of reliability as suggested by Neuendorf (2002). Rep 
comprises the scores of the aspects 1-9, proc covers the categories 10-15, and opi 
measures the aspects 16-19 listed in appendix A.
The theoretical range of scores obtained from the content analysis is from 0 to 19. The 
average score across the whole sample amounts to 13.47, thus approximately 71% of 
the total maximum score. The region that scores best is south africa with an average of 
14.33 points, whereas Hong Kong still represents the lower end with an average score of 
10 points. The assurance statement of Rabobank (the Netherlands) achieved the highest 
score of 18 points, while the lowest score was attained by Thiess (Australia) with 7 points. 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlation among variables for those 
firms issuing a sustainability assurance statement in our sample (n=69). It appears that 
the correlations are relatively low, thus suggesting that multicollinearity is not likely to 
be a serious concern in the estimation of the regression models.
4. Results
The results of the logistic regression (model 1) with dependent variable aud are reported 
in table 4. Because the number of observations varies across countries, we use weighted 
logistic regression (which weights each country equally) for all estimations so that 
observations receive more (less) weight in countries with fewer (more) observations 
(Cohen et al., 2003, p. 309). The model is significant with a pseudo r2 of 31%. The
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coefficient on gotr and enf are significantly negative at less than 5% level. Similarly, 
the coefficient on lit is significantly negative at 10% level. The results from model (1) 
lend support to hypothesis 1. The likelihood of having a sustainable report assured by a 
big-4 accounting firm is significantly higher for firms domiciled in countries with a weak 
legal environment. This is consistent with a growing body of research in accounting and 
finance documenting that high quality auditing firms may play a stronger governance 
role in weak legal environments than in strong legal environments. The ncri control 
variables is significant at 10% level, suggesting that firms operating in countries with a 
higher sustainability profile are more likely to choose a big-4 firm as assurance provider. 
The remaining control variables are not significant.
Table 4. Choice of assurance provider
Variable (pred. sign)
Model (1)
Logistic 
Regression§
Model (2)
Ordered probit regression§
Gotr (-) -0.434**(0.045)
-0.194
(0.609)
Enf (-) -2.281**(0.012)
-0.219*
(0.080)
Lit (-) -6.240*(0.100)
-2.017***
(0.004)
Ncri 0.179*(0.090)
0.115
(0.516)
Size 0.071(0.656)
0.149**
(0.023)
Prof -0.037(0.962)
0.144
(0.325)
Ind 1.118(0.516)
0.367*
(0.066)
Constant 46.362**(0.031)
Pseudo r2 0.313 0.105
Wald chi-square   63.91 88.35
P-value 0.000*** 0.000***
N 69 136
Dependent variable model (1): aud (1 assurance provider big-4; 0 otherwise)
Dependent variable model (2): aud (2 assurance provider big-4; 1 assurance provider non-big-4; 
0 no assurance statement)
*** significant at the p<0.01 level
** significant at the p<0.05 level
* significant at the p<0.1 level
§ all z-statistics (in parentheses) are computed based on clustered standard errors.
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Next, we run an ordered probit regression (model 2) to provide robustness to our analysis. 
The model is significant with a pseudo r2 of 10.5%. The coefficients on enf (z<0.10) 
and lit (z<0.01) are significantly negative. In contrast, gotr is not statistically significant. 
Despite the partial support for the coefficient on gotr, the evidence does not contradict 
the results of the logistic regression model. Among the control variables, size and ind 
are significantly positive.
Table 5 shows the standardized coefficients of the regression analysis with respectively 
rep, proc and opi as dependent variables capturing three aggregated dimensions of
Table 5. quality of assurance
Variable 
(pred. Sign)
Model (3)
Ols regression§
Model (4)
Ols regression§
Model (5)
Ols regression§
Aud (+, + , -) 1.843***(0.000)
0.587**
(0.025)
-0.670**
(0.042)
Gotr 0.494(0.230)
-0.039
(0.145)
0.259
(0.484)
Enf -0.077(0.619)
-0.042
(0.775)
-0.099
(0.529)
Lit -1.189(0.274)
-0.894*
(0.086)
-0.504
(0.569)
Ncri -0.003(0.090)
0.522***
(0.001)
0.340
(0.175)
Size 0.067(0.637)
0.069
(0.472)
0.221**
(0.033)
Prof 0.607**(0.034)
0.680*
(0.078)
0.365
(0.877)
Ind 0.222(0.628)
0.581*
(0.067)
-0.023
(0.970)
Constant -4.245 (0.941)
1.603
 (0.706)
-5.651
 (0.195)
R2 0.569 0.405 0.315
F 45.29 23.60 6.17
P-value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001***
N 69 69 69
Dependent variable model (3): rep
Dependent variable model (4): proc
Dependent variable model (5): opi
*** significant at the p<0.01 level 
** significant at the p <0.05 level
* significant at the p <0.1 level
§ all t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed based on clustered standard errors.
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assurance quality. The country-level variables gotr, enf and lit that have been used in the 
previous analysis as independent variables now serve as control variables. Similarly to 
model (1) and (2), we use weighted least squares regression to analyze the data to adjust 
for the uneven representation of countries in our sample. 
All three models are significant with r2 of respectively 57%, 40% and 31%. As predicted 
by hypothesis 2a, the results indicate that rep is positively associated by a big-4 firm 
(p<0.01). Similarly, hypothesis 2b is confirmed since the coefficient on aud is significantly 
associated with proc (p<0.05). Notably, it appears that the level of assurance provided 
with regards to the assurance approach is negatively associated with the litigation 
level (p<0.10) and positively associated with the sustainability ranking (p<0.01) of the 
country in which the report is issued. Next, we can also confirm hypothesis 2c, since the 
coefficients on aud is significantly negative (p<0.05), thus suggesting that the level of 
recommendations and final opinion provided by a big-4 firm is lower than other types 
of assurors. From the content analysis performed, it appears that specialist consultancies 
and certification bodies make extensive use of the AA1000AS approach. This standard 
focuses heavily on the stakeholder perspective and emphasizes aspects of materiality, 
completeness and responsiveness. The subcategory “conclusion” (see appendix a) is made 
up of four different aspects, three of which are covered by AA1000AS. Thus, although 
accountants tend to deliver higher quality assurance from an overall perspective, it can 
be inferred that other types of assurors have a relative advantage in terms of providing 
higher quality recommendations.
5. Conclusions
This study adds to the limited prior descriptive evidence in the area of sustainability 
assurance (e.g. O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005; Deegan et al., 2006). In particular, it extends 
prior findings of Mock et al. (2007) about the choice and effects of an assurance provider 
for sustainability reporting. Given that assurance services for sustainability reporting is 
a fairly recent and unregulated field, this paper also contributes to the literature on the 
adoption of voluntary non-financial assurance services (Hasan et al., 2005).
The conclusions of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, we investigated which 
factors explain the choice of a big-4 assurance provider. Consistently with recent studies 
in accounting and finance showing the importance of national legal environments, we 
predicted that firms domiciled in weaker legal systems are more likely to choose a large 
accounting firm as assuror of their sustainability reports. Our findings confirm this line 
of reasoning, in line with prior research on the determinants of governance mechanisms 
(e.g. Durnev and Kim, 2005) and auditor choice for financial reporting (e.g. Choi and 
Wong, 2007).  Sustainability assurance services may serve as a good corporate governance 
substitute role when legal protection of corporate investors and stakeholders is weak in 
ensuring control over the credibility and quality of disclosed social and environmental 
information.
Second, we extend the model by Mock et al. (2007) by investigating whether the quality 
of assurance statements depends upon the choice of an assurance provider. We performed 
a content analysis of a representative sample of sustainability assurance statements relying 
International Journal of Management Vol. 26 No. 3 December 2009 423
on a coherent evaluation approach of assurance quality proposed by O’Dwyer and Owen 
(2005). Our findings indicate that big-4 assurors provide a higher quality of assurance 
in comparison with other assurance providers on aspects related to reporting format and 
procedures used when conducting the verification. On the contrary, assurance statements 
issued by big-4 firms rank lower for aspects associated to recommendations and opinion. 
The results of this study have managerial implications for the selection of sustainability 
assurance providers. There are country-level factors related to the quality of the legal 
environment that should be considered before choosing the appropriate independent 
assuror. Similarly, reporting companies should be aware that the added value of assurance 
statements issued by a big-4 accounting firm depends on the criteria used to assess the 
accuracy and completeness of an assurance engagement. 
This study suffers from a series of limitations about the empirical modelling, sampling 
and data examined. First, the substantial lack of data in the area of corporate sustainable 
management represents a severe practical constraint to extend the investigation to 
additional explanatory factors, particularly when data is collected from different countries. 
Second, although the diffusion of sustainability reports and assurance statements is 
increasing, it is virtually impossible to obtain sufficient observations based on a strict 
random sample to conduct meaningful statistical tests. 
Despite these weaknesses, the results of our paper warrant future investigations. Future 
research should focus on the replication of this study in different settings, with larger 
samples and with a longitudinal design in order to substantiate the findings obtained. 
Further, there is a need to refine the theoretical framework investigated in this study, 
by considering in particular additional firm-level drivers of sustainability assurance 
services, such as a company’s experience in reporting, its scale of operations, and the 
specific demands of its stakeholders.
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Appendix A
The table contains the aspects used for the content analysis of the assurance statements 
following the framework proposed by O’Dwyer and Owen (2005). For each aspect, we 
indicate in parentheses the guidelines elaborated by accountability (2003), FEE (2004) 
and GRI (2002). Each variable has been coded 0 in case of no reference, or 1 in case of 
reference in the assurance statement.
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Categories (guidelines) Definition
Category “reporting format” (rep):
1. Title (FEE, GRI) Title of the assurance statement
2. Addressee (AA1000, FEE, GRI) Party to whom the assurance statement is formally addressed (either in title, separate addressee line, or within text)
3. Name of assuror (FEE, GRI) Name of the firm that conducts the assurance engagement
4. Location of assuror (FEE, GRI) Location of the office of the assurance provider
5. Report date (FEE, GRI) Reference to the date at which the assurance exercise was finished
6. Responsibilities of reporter (FEE, GRI) Explicit statement that reporter is responsible for preparation of report (keywords: responsible, responsibility)
7. Responsibilities of assuror (FEE, GRI)
Explicit statement that the reporter is responsible to express an 
(independent) opinion on the subject matter (the sustainability/
environmental/social report)
8. Independence of assuror from reporting 
organization (AA1000, FEE, GRI) Statement expressing the independence of the two parties involved
9. Impartiality of assuror  towards 
stakeholders (AA1000)
Assuror’s declaration of impartiality with respect to stakeholder 
interests
Category “assurance procedures” (proc):
10. Scope of the assurance engagement 
(AA1000, FEE, GRI)
Assurance statement coverage (a 1 was assigned if anywhere in the 
assurance statement the coverage of the assurance exercise is stated)
11. Objective of the assurance 
engagement (AA1000, FEE, GRI)
Objective to be achieved through the engagement (indicating the 
level of assurance intended) 
12. Competencies of assuror (AA1000, 
FEE)
Description of the professional skills that enable the engagement 
team to conduct the assurance exercise
13. Criteria used to assess evidence and 
reach conclusion (AA1000, FEE, GRI)
A statement that makes reference to particular criteria against which 
the sustainability report has been prepared (e.g. GRI and often 
internally developed standards)
14. Assurance standard used (AA1000, 
FEE, GRI)
Standards used which govern the work of the assurance provider 
(e.g. AA1000AS)
15.summary of work performed (AA1000, 
GRI) Statement explaining the actions taken to arrive at a conclusion
Category “recommendations and 
opinion” (opi):
16. Materiality (from a stakeholder 
perspective)  (AA1000)
Degree of information provision on materiality level (when 
the conclusion states that the report is in conformance with 
the AA1000AS principles (materiality, completeness and 
responsiveness) this qualifies for a reference, and thus a 1 was 
assigned)
17. Completeness (AA1000)
Statement expressing that all material aspects are covered by the 
report (when the conclusion states that the report is in conformance 
with the AA1000AS principles of materiality, completeness and 
responsiveness this qualifies for a reference and thus, a 1 will be 
assigned)
18. Responsiveness to stakeholder 
(AA1000)
Statement referring to the organization’s procedures (or lack of 
them) for identifying stakeholder interests and concerns 
19. General conclusion/opinion (AA1000, 
FEE,GRI)
Statement expressing the result of the assurance exercise (if 
there is no general conclusion, but the conclusion solely refers to 
the 3 principles of AA1000AS of materiality, completeness and 
responsiveness, a 0 was assigned)

